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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   Just about three months before the Volkswagen-manipulations of exhaust fumes were 
revealed and caused the biggest corporate scandal in the history of this carmaker, the 
group proudly published latest the results of their compliance-related measures. For 
VW, at that time the world still seemed to be in order. Due to an intensive preventive 
work, it was said, as a consequence of suspected independent controls, of “intensive 
investigations” and of checking “basic procedures”, one would conduct “a very effec-
tive”, successful and sustainable compliance management. Representatives of VW´s 
compliance department supported their statements by presenting the following figures: 
in the year 2014 every third employee (185.000 persons) had participated in compliance 
training events, the internal audit department had started investigations in 365 cases, 72 
employees had lost their jobs because of irregularities, and one had terminated contracts 
with business partners in 16 cases because they had given cause for suspicion.1 Further-
more, even the anti-corruption organization Transparency International in their sus-
tainability report at the end of 2014 ranked VW in the leading group of world`s largest 
transparent companies.2 
 
When shortly thereafter the scandal came to light, all these assurances and assessments 
turned out to be untenable assertions. The whole compliance management suddenly 
was left foolishly dangling in the winds. And especially after it was revealed that officials 
of VW already had been informed about possible illegal manipulation in 2011, the case 
raises the following questions: why did it to take so much time unless the fraud came to 
light? Where have the company`s inspectors been? What went wrong with the commu-
nication and cooperation between the internal investigators, the engineers and the man-
agement staff? Why could compliance not fulfill its purpose? Because the actual case of 
VW is not an isolated incident – similar phenomena of failing compliance procedures 
were already observed in cases like Siemens, Daimler or MAN –, this paper focuses on a 
general reason for the failure of compliance. 
 
In the following the reason for this will be primarily identified with failing processes of 
establishing legal norms within an organizational context. Therefore the text highlights 
the topic of failing compliance from an organizational sociological perspective based on 
observations made during a training seminar for compliance officers. Organizations, this 
will be the underlying basic assumption of the following argumentation, normally act as 			
1 Statements by Peter Dörfler, Head of Auditing and Stephan Wolf, Member of the Compliance Council of 
VW. 
2
 Transparency International Deutschland e.V., Nachhaltigkeitsberichte Deutscher Großunternehmen 
Wiederholungsstudie 2014, available at 
https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Wirtschaft/Nachhaltigkeitsberichte_ Grossun-
ternehmen_2014.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).  
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co-producers in processes of enforcing legal norms.3 
 
By using programs, guidelines, instructions and controls, they translate social law into 
internal, formal rules or “organizational law”. Such organizational activities are legally 
binding and normally there is nothing new or problematic with them. Implementing 
legislation, for example in the fields of consumer law, tax law or labor law, has a long 
history and has long been carried out by routine work. Members of organizations by 
and large became familiar with these topics and normally employees understand what is 
expected of them. This looks different in the field of corporate crime law. Here, a rou-
tine implementation of legal norms is difficult because business criminal law is a very 
dynamic and complex law sector, marked by numerous changes on the one hand. On 
the other hand a translation of legal norms is complicated for organizations here because 
of internal, structural reasons. This article will examine some of these reasons. The thesis 
is that in the case of compliance, the coexistence of organizational norms and legal rules 
(“hard law” and “soft law”) causes tensions and structural conflicts, because it disturbs 
the inner order, cooperative relationships and the role structure of the organization. 
Newly established compliance systems tend to undermine the legitimacy of legal norms, 
because they tend to prevent routine procedures of control, and they tend to fail to pro-
vide target groups with definite orientation. 
 
In the following sections such assumptions will be explored empirically. In a first step, 
general characteristics and consequences of compliance as a new form of control of 
white-collar crime are sketched from an organizational sociological perspective (II.). 
Second, expectations and perceptions of compliance officers will be described when it 
comes to implementing legal norms. These perceptions are reconstructed on the basis of 
a participant observation made during a training seminar for compliance officers in 
Germany (III.). The article concludes with a statement that identifies the problems of 
translating legal norms into organizational structures with the fundamental and struc-
tural characteristics of organizations as social forms (IV.).  
 
II. COMPLIANCE AND THE ORDER OF CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
   The ongoing boom of compliance as a subject and a market for corporations world-
wide can be explained by a change of the legal situation in the field of economic crime. 
Reflecting on the development in this field, one can say that there has happened a kind 
of “outcry” for control as a consequence of the scandals, accounting frauds and 			
3
  Lauren Edelman & Marc C. Suchman, When the Haves hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational 
Internalization of Law, Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository (1999), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1802&context=facpubs (last visited Oct. 12, 
2015); SIM B. SITKIN & ROBERT J. BIES (eds.), THE LEGALISITIC ORGANIZATION (1994). 
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smashups around Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000nds. Since then the relevant 
laws have been continuously tightened. As a consequence of changes in corporate crim-
inal law, corporations are faced with increasing demands to take action themselves. The 
state and the public expect more “translation work” from business corporations. These 
are forced to launch new forms of control, and therefore new compliance systems are 
established in order to strengthen the link between organizational processes and legal 
norms.4 
 
What might this development mean for the internal structure of organizations and their 
orders of control? What kind of measures seems appropriate and reasonable to put the 
new legal norms into controlling practice? Controlling structures in organizations, this is 
an old and proven finding in organization sociology, work best when they are based on 
routines, clear cut tasks, comprehensible instructions and when they are embedded in 
satisfactory exchange relations.5 But in contrast to this, a new feature of the law-
compliance-control-constellation is a combination of various distinct requirements, 
heterogeneous purposes and demands on the firms. Besides an increase of regulative 
rules, judicial criminal controls and besides increasing liability risks, an increased sensi-
bility of the public towards economic crime constitutes an additional factor corpora-
tions have to take into consideration. Accordingly, organizations are expected to adapt 
to possible rule-breaking behavior or to violations of norms simultaneously in a preven-
tive, actively controlling and reactively-investigative manner. This bundle of necessities 
can lead to a mutual reinforcement of each sub-target of compliance, involving a re-
building of the organizational structure as a whole. By this, the new legal requirements 
show new characteristics in three dimensions: 
 
  With regard to the factual accuracy of organizational behavior and responsibili-
ties, the new regulatory-legal expectations are causes of disorder. They are less 
clearly and less uniquely defined as before and they are sometimes topically dif-
fuse. Different areas of organizational work can simultaneously be affected by 
the tightening of criminal law. Therefore, as a result of numerous new regula-
tions, grey areas between “still allowed” and “forbidden” ways of behavior in-
crease.  
  Concerning the social sphere of organizations, new social roles, new contact ar-
eas and new potential conflicts between employees can develop. Due to creating 
new compliance-jobs or departments, new responsibilities emerge in organiza-
tions that tend to collide with already existing controlling institutions (for in-			
4
  Ralf Kölbel, Wirtschaftskriminalität und unternehmensinterne Strafrechtsdurchsetzung, 91 MschrKrim, 22, 
22  (2008); Hans Krause Hansen, Managing corruption risks, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 251, 253f. (18.2011). 
5
  Jeffrey Pfeffer, The costs of legalization, in The Legalisitc Organization (Sim B Sitkim & Robert Bies 
eds.1994); ARNOLD. S. TANNENBAUM, CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 14ff. (1971). 
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stance the internal audit department). Relationships of trust, loyalties, work-
flows and routines can be jeopardized by compliance. 
  From a temporal perspective, the new compliance control differs from conven-
tional references to law insofar it is now put on a permanent footing. Now law 
as an external premise of organizational decision making is not a single, excep-
tionally activated medium anymore. Rather, it has developed to an ongoing 
background-theme of work, for example mentioned in regular trainings, in 
codes of conduct, in risk assessments or in monitoring processes. By compli-
ance, legal considerations in general are more strongly connected to everyday-
practices. 
 
To sum it up: the described factors and characteristics of compliance are meant to 
strengthen the connection between organizational and legal norms. Law shall be more 
“embedded”6 in organizational rules of procedures as well as in areas of responsibility. It 
is supposed to guide activities much stronger. For this purpose, controls become more 
formalized and differentiated, rules are modified. In general, one could say, for organiza-
tions the introduction of compliance takes on the character of a reform. But still today it 
seems to be generally difficult to implement these rights based compliance-reforms. 
Research on this topic, among other things, report on credibility problems or on a defi-
cient deterrence of corporate misconduct.7 
 
Regarding this, the crucial issue we are confronted with is how this problem presents 
itself from the point of view of compliance officers. How are problems of the transla-
tion/ implementation of legal norms practically articulated? We will discuss these ques-
tions on the basis of experiences made during a compliance-training seminar. 
 
III. CONSULTANCY EXPRIENCES IN THE FIELD OF COMPLIANCE 
 
   The observations described in the following result from data recorded during partici-
pation in a one-week further education seminar for business professionals and execu-
tives. This seminar, conducted in winter 2014, aimed at qualifying the participants as 
certified so called “compliance officers”. The total number of participants was 19, most 
of them being in charge of compliance, i. e. they were executives from organizational 			
6
  ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, WHEN FORMALITY WORKS 6 (2001). 
7
  Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Washington 
University Law Quarterly 487, 490 f. (2003); Jonas Pape, Zur Wirksamkeit von Corporate Compliance, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 233, 236 (6.2009); CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE LEH-
MANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE (2011); Ralf Kölbel, Wirksamkeit und Funktionsbedin-
gungen von Compliance aus wirtschaftskriminologischer Sicht, in Handbuch Criminal Compliance 1443 (Rot-
sch ed., 2014). 
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supervisory departments (e. g. internal audit or legal department), most of whom work-
ing for bigger, sometimes internationally operating industrial, services or financial en-
terprises. In the course of the seminar, a total number of six different experts gave lec-
tures of four to eight hours every day, among them experts for commercial criminal law, 
a public prosecutor, a compliance officer from a DAX-30 enterprise as well as auditors. 
The lectures were, among others, on legal bases, liability risks, compliance organization, 
prevention, public prosecutor investigations, compliance in the commercial field, data 
protection and IT compliance as well as so called reactive compliance (internal investiga-
tions). The author made notes during his participation and fixed his observations in 
writing immediately after the end of the seminar. Furthermore, seminar-related docu-
ments were assessed, and there was the possibility to interview selected participants. 
 
A. The functions of Compliance 
 
Despite the participants showing a basically reserved attitude towards the topic of the 
seminar (“This is just a fashionable issue”; “We´re breaking a butterfly on a wheel”)8, the 
predominant opinion among the participants was that the establishment of compliance 
control in their own companies was necessary. The function of compliance – this be-
came clearly obvious by the questions and discussions – was first of all considered a 
means to be on the safe side when it comes to external prosecution and to avoiding lia-
bilities and image damages for their own companies. The lecturers and the future com-
pliance officers considered it their predominant task to protect colleagues from prosecu-
tion by the state: “This is what we´re all interested in: I must internally protect the staff 
member”. The prevention of business delinquency was only of secondary interest. Thus, 
from the point of view of those concerned – and this is a first astonishing insight – a 
crucial action-stimulating risk results rather from the activities of state supervision and 
sanctioning authorities than from the threat of potential business delinquents. The 
threat was symbolized by the figure of the prosecutor. The prosecutor, about whom 
jokes were made already on the first day, symbolized the hostile forces and bound the 
participants together. The threat scenario of a humiliating “visit” by the prosecutor 
together with his marauding customs officers appeared again and again (“The customs 
officers are always armed; they even come early in the morning when the children are 
still sitting at the table”), anecdotes of this kind were told eight times on the whole. Also 
the US American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was mentioned: “I´d ra-
ther like to have trouble with the Mafia than with the SEC”, one compliance officer was 
heard. “Take care that you´re on the safe side, because in case of doubt you are the scape-
goat”, was a lecturer´s advice concerning the topic “cooperation with authorities”. The 
repressive component of legal social control was much more emphasized than preven-
tive or protecting aspects. Expenses resulting from legal prosecution seemed to be much 			
8
  In the following, text in italics refers to quotations of seminar- participants. 
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weightier than possible damage by criminal business activities as such. Compliance func-
tions such as informing staff members of marketing issues were discussed in much more 
detail than functions such as risk assessment or criminal law prevention. 
 
B. Vagueness and Operationalization of Legal Norms 
 
According to my observations, one crucial problem from the point of view of those 
being in charge of compliance was that the norms, regulations and instructions were said 
to lack “concrete application examples and practical references”. “The dirty work of oper-
ationalizing”, as one interview partner had it, or the “question of implementation” were 
considered a core problem of their tasks. As far as exemplary cases were presented, one 
took them up thankfully and discussed them. In such cases it was most of all about find-
ing out about legal boundaries and about in which situations a legal norm could in 
which ways be practically implemented. This operationalization problem of legal norms 
can be exemplarily demonstrated by the example of the criminal law on corruption. The 
bête noire for those present was unclear limit between legal and illegal behavior in this 
field. Anti-corruption compliance, this is well known, is meanwhile considered an oblig-
atory element of each organizational set of regulations, however due to the “mazy” legal 
situation it is difficult to implement. This was confirmed during the seminar. All partic-
ipants estimated the risk of being liable under criminal or civil law to be high, however 
there was uncertainty when it came to the actual meaning of legal terms and thus also 
when it came to the actual design of effective compliance tools. For example, there was 
uncertainty concerning the “appropriate extent” of hospitality, the beginning of the 
“illegal preference“ of clients, or concerning the question of which people may be invited 
on which business-relevant occasions. There were different opinions about appropriate 
ways of control, in particular when it comes to sales staff. There were extensive discus-
sions about the fact that difference between legal cultivation of contacts and criminal 
corruption is difficult to define, in particular if a company operates within the scopes of 
different national laws und must take cultural differences concerning the habits of its 
clients into consideration. Against this background, it was said, the legal norms were 
damaging to business, in so far as they were said to ruin the trust in clients and business 
partners. In his branch, one participant stated, it had for decades been an essential ele-
ment of corporate identity to invite business partners. After all, one had been successful 
only because one had highly estimated “interpersonal relations”, and currently the topic 
was “completely exaggerated”. Staff members moving “in the minefields between crimi-
nality and social adequacy”, it was said, were increasingly feeling at a loss, and now one 
even had to “spy on them”. The fact that furthermore the appropriate trainings or tests 
for staff members were often at “kindergarten level” (approving laughter among those 
present) confirms the overall impression that in this legal field it is difficult to practice 
any organization-internal operationalization of legal norms and that these norms meet 
little acceptance. As it is easy to see, the function of law, i. e. coding social situations in 
such a way as to make them distinctive, is not fulfilled in this field. The problems looked 
similar in the fields of antitrust law, money laundering legislation and data protection 
law. One lecturer got at the heart of the problem connected to the operationalization of 
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the appropriate legal norms when stating: “One must work out clear rules and guidelines 
even if there is no explicit legal regulation.” 
 
C. Role Conflicts and Organization-internal Disregard 
 
Beyond the so far sketched legal norms-related problems of operationalization, the par-
ticipants in the seminar were also clearly under stress from inner-company role require-
ments as well as from thus connected conflicts and lack of recognition. Apart from tasks 
such as training, marketing and risk assessment, the compliance officers are most of all 
burdened by mediating and control tasks. The question of which tasks should be focus 
of a compliance officer in the ideal case was discussed by several participants. A conse-
quence of the basically both many and unclear responsibilities of the compliance officer 
is disrespect at the company. For example, one participant told at his company initially 
he had been treated as an annoying “miniature pinscher” by the board (he had to “beg” 
for resources), as a competitor by colleagues from the legal and internal audit depart-
ments, and as a “bloodhound” by the staff members. He then had to spent much effort 
on receiving recognition, by “canvassing from door to door”. To keep compliance pro-
cesses out of power struggles and clashes of interests or to prevent competition and rival-
ry, one lecture recommended: “Talk to everybody involved, talking is important”; for: “to 
survive in the long run you must not be a lone wolf”. At the same time, he said, the com-
pliance officer had to be careful to stay independent and not to interfere with the opera-
tive business. Thus, one had to be involved without being allowed to participate in deci-
sion-making, as was the paradox looking advice. There were several lectures and discus-
sions about this topic, the basic clarification of the compliance officer´s possibilities to 
influence and competences. According to these contributions, a compliance officer sel-
dom meets acceptance. During a lunch break a staff member of an internationally active 
industrial company told what the management of his company thinks about compli-
ance: “They [the management] don´t care about compliance, they say: `well, write a ten 
topics paper´, they stay among themselves, you won´t be allowed there”. Also other partici-
pants in the seminar told about lacking recognition at their companies as well as about 
the difficulties of wanting to advise and support colleagues on the one hand and, being 
internal controllers, the obligation to keep distance on the other. “How do you avoid the 
impression that you secretly report on colleagues?” was one question which was left unan-
swered. 
 
These spotlights on the seminar or on the problems told by the compliance officers 
illustrate that the role of the compliance officer seems to be characterized by difficult 
tasks, by conflicts and contradicting demands. On the whole, attending this seminar left 
the impression that the inner-organization implementation of given norms of criminal 
law by way of compliance is problematic in several respects: It does not reduce complexi-
ty (rather it creates new uncertainties), it does not seem to provide those involved with 
fixed points of orientation, it does not initiate any standardized procedures, and it does 
hardly support motivation and identification with formal control structures. However, 
making law valid within an organization requires support by recognized, transparent, 
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legitimation-providing rules. It seems as if it is still a long way to go until a system of 
rules which is secured by established knowledge stocks and serves as a basis of the legiti-
macy of norms of criminal law becomes institutionalized. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The starting point for the considerations here was the assumption that usually organiza-
tions contribute as co-producers to the making legal norms valid in society, by translat-
ing norms into formal organizational structures in the form of “secondary law” or “soft 
law”. Some problems when it comes to implementing such translation, embedding and 
control processes of legal norms in the case of compliance in the context of commercial 
criminal law have been exemplarily sketched on the basis of experiences made at training 
seminar for compliance officers. This way it has become clear that obviously compliance 
generates inner-organizational structural conflicts, as it ties organizational norms more 
closely to legal norms, thus blocking the system´s own mechanisms legal norms are usu-
ally based on. Among these mechanisms there belong clearly defined roles and compe-
tences, implementable procedures and routines, but also the possibility to make, if nec-
essary, trust-based adjustments of the inflexible framework of rules. Usually, efficient 
formal structures within an organization provide expectation-supporting certainty but 
also allow for flexibility; they are “informally embedded”. In the case of compliance-
control, both functions of organizational formality seem to fail: The structure does 
neither work as a stable point of reference one can rely on if necessary and which stand-
ardizes room for manoeuvre nor does it serve as a protective wall or ritual facade behind 
which one can make informal agreements. Non-transparency and flexibility – necessary 
preconditions for the functioning of organizational practice – are thus lost. The “costs 
of the statutory regulation of an organization”,9 the weakening of loyal relationships as 
well as the prevention of the capability to adjust are increased. If legitimacy is defined as 
the “generalized readiness to accept as yet undefined decisions within certain tolerance 
limits”,10 these costs or transparency expectations coming along with compliance in 
connection with criminal law make it ever more improbable. As a result of this legitima-
cy loss on the other hand commercial criminal law fails to act as a kind of social control, 
for it is hardly able any more to stabilize normative expectations. Thus, the intended 
privatization of commercial criminal law supports an erosion of norms, after all. This 
means that commercial criminal law as we know it is hardly able to keep its promise to 
prevent undesired or socially harmful conduct and to control business. 
			
9
  Pfeffer 1994, as cited above in footnote 5. 
10
  NIKLAS LUHMANN, LEGITIMATION DURCH VERFAHREN 28 (3rd Edition1983). 
